

Ludwig Landgrebe's Phenomenology of Moods

Ignacio Quepons

Preview

In a letter dated February 5, 1933, Husserl shares his disagreements over an attempt to connect the notion of the horizon with the Heideggerian philosophy of moods with Landgrebe. Husserl claims that for him, moods are founded in a more elementary dimension of life-consciousness that is the dimension conferring objectivity to the phenomena of experience:

According to what I'm hearing, you are still always trying to transform my theory of horizons in a Heideggerian way, and thus to establish a connection between us. I am quite certain that this is not possible and that mood is not an elementary phenomenon, but lies at a higher level that only comes later in the systematic analysis of founding-founded relationships. Yet you shall and must find your own way and come to your own clarity step by step.

The origin of the controversy was Landgrebe's project for a Habilitationsschrift entitled *The Concept of Experiencing*, where we may find one of the first attempts in the phenomenological tradition at a genetic-phenomenological description of affective life.

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Preliminary Contexts: Moods, Intentionality, and Horizons – Landgrebe Between Husserl and Heidegger

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¹ I am very grateful for the precious help, suggestions and revision of Elizabeth Behnke. I am also grateful for the wise comments and support of Hans Rainer Sepp and Karel Novotny regarding the study of Landgrebe's contribution to phenomenology of moods. Additionally, I want to thank Sylvain Camilleri for his confidence in my work.

² "Nach dem was ich davon höre, mühen Sie sich noch immer mit dem Versuch meine Lehre von den Horizonten in Heideggerschem Sinn umzugestalten und so doch eine Verbindung zwischen mir und ihm herzustellen. Ich bin ganz sicher, daß das nicht möglich ist und daß die Stimmung ein ganz hochliegendes und nicht elementares Phänomen ist, zu dem die systematische Fundierungsanalyse eben auch erst spät kommen kann. Doch Sie werden und müssen Ihren Weg sich bahnen und schrittweis zu selbsteigener Klarheit kommen" – Edmund Husserl, Hua Dok III/4, *Briefwechsel: Die Freiburger Schüler*, ed. K. Schuhmann with E. Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 305–306.

attempts in the phenomenological tradition at a genetic-phenomenological description of affective life.

Landgrebe drafted an answer to his master defending his point:

It is not at all my intention to transform your theory of horizons in a Heideggerian direction; on the contrary, I would like to attempt to show that what Heidegger characterizes as horizon-formation concerns genuine constitutive problems—problems that can certainly come into view as long as one remains in a mundane attitude. To be able to speak of horizon-formation in this sense always already presupposes a subjectivity already in possession of typical predelineations for the further course of its experiences, predelineations whose origin lies in the subjectivity's mundane community with others. My analysis of moods, which I would not like to claim are elementary phenomena, also belongs to this context.³

This discussion, and in a certain way Husserl's reservations about Landgrebe's hypothesis, is grounded in Heidegger's explicit criticism of the primacy of intentionality in Husserl's phenomenology. According to Heidegger, the fundamental structure of "being-in-the-world" precedes the thematic intentionality that supports judgments and consequently active reflection.⁴

Husserl himself was aware the explicit intentional direction was lacking in the case of emotive dispositions such as moods. There are important notes from 1893–94 on the topic⁵, and in particular, there are descriptions of moods in the unpublished project titled *Studies on the Structure of Consciousness*.⁶ After

³ "Es ist durchaus nicht mein Bestreben, Ihre Lehre von den Horizonten in Heideggerscher Richtung umzugestalten, sondern im Gegenteil, ich wollte zeigen, daß das, was Heidegger als Horizontbildung bezeichnet, eigentlich konstitutive Probleme betrifft, die freilich, solange man in mundaner Einstellung verbleibt, als Probleme der Horizontbildung in den Blick kommen können. Um in diesem Sinn von Horizontbildung sprechen zu können, ist schon immer eine Subjektivität vorausgesetzt, die sich bereits im Besitz von typischen Vorzeichnungen für den weiteren Verlauf ihrer Erfahrungen befindet, von Vorzeichnungen, die ihre Herkunft aus der weltlichen Gemeinschaft der Subjektivität mit den anderen haben. In diesem Zusammenhang steht auch meine Analyse der Stimmungen, die ich nicht als elementare Phänomene in Anspruch nehmen möchte" – Edmund Husserl, Hua Dok III/4, 307.

⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2006), 134ff.

⁵ Edmund Husserl, Hua XXXVIII, *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912)*, ed. T. Vongehr and R. Giuliani (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 176; Antonio Ziri6n, "Colorations and Moods in Husserl's *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins* (with a final hint toward the coloring of life)," *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 16, (2018), 44.

⁶ Edmund Husserl, Hua XLIII/2, *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*. ed. U. Melle and T. Vongehr (Dordrecht: Springer, 2021), 101ss.; Antonio Ziri6n. "Colorations and Moods in Husserl's *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*," *passim*.

this period, presumably with Heidegger's criticisms in mind, we find other mentions in Husserl's *Nachlass* regarding the topic of *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmungen*, precisely from the time of his discussion with Landgrebe.⁷ Meanwhile, both Landgrebe and Heidegger knew about Husserl's manuscripts for the *Studies on the Structure of Consciousness*. Landgrebe himself edited a full draft of the treatise in 1926,⁸ and in a letter dated October 22, 1927, to Husserl, Heidegger explicitly acknowledges that he has carefully read Landgrebe's typescript of the *Studies*.⁹ Yet Heidegger never mentions this in his published works; on the contrary, in *Sein und Zeit* he explicitly claims that even a psychology of moods is "a field which in any case still lies fallow."¹⁰

It is undeniable that Heidegger opened an unprecedented philosophical dimension to the problem of moods. However, as a matter of fact, moods were already a topic of discussion from a number of different perspectives, in the phenomenological psychology of that time¹¹, as well as for Husserl himself.¹² On the other hand, it is also true that Husserl did not develop a full phenomenological description of moods. It is nevertheless possible at least to sketch out some key points of his understanding of this lived experience by following his notes in his research manuscripts. In this regard it is important to mention not only the *Studies on the Structures of Consciousness*, but also Husserl's notes on Stumpf's *Psychologie der Ton*.¹³

Even though there is no univocal meaning for the expression *Stimmung* in Husserl's writings¹⁴, it is clear that moods are related to the affective unity of

⁷ See Edmund Husserl, Hua Mat VIII, *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte*, ed. D. Lohmar, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 319.

⁸ Edmund Husserl, Hua XLIII, /1 *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*. ed. U. Melle and T. Vongehr (Dordrecht: Springer, 2021), lvi.

⁹ Edmund Husserl, Hua IX, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, ed. W. Biemel (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 601.

¹⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 134.

¹¹ See Ingrid Vendrell, *Die Emotionen, Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008), 145.

¹² Ullrich Melle, "Husserl's deskriptive Erforschung der Gefühlserlebnisse," in *Life, Subjectivity, and Art: Essays in Honor of Rudolf Bernet*, ed. R. Breeur and U. Melle, 51–99 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 81, 91–95.

¹³ See, e.g., Edmund Husserl, Hua XXXVIII, *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912)*, ed. T. Vongehr and R. Giuliani (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 159f., 168ff., 180f.

¹⁴ Antonio Ziri6n, "Colorations and Moods in Husserl's *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*," 56.

the stream of consciousness¹⁵; what is interesting is that even though they may lack an object to which they refer, or even an explicit motivation, he acknowledges in his manuscripts that moods do preserve a sort of intentionality.¹⁶ Even though it seems ~~to be~~ clear that for Husserl moods are not “elementary” phenomena and thus—as he mentions in his letter to Landgrebe—do not play a primary role in the primal constitution of the world as horizon, it is possible to claim that at least in the context of founded [*fundierte*] acts, there is a kind of intentional horizon involved in the emotive background-consciousness of moods and their correlates as founded in primitive acts of representation.¹⁷

Now it is true that the possibility of describing moods in terms of the Husserlian theory of horizons has been already pointed out by a number of different scholars in recent decades.¹⁸ But it is also possible that Landgrebe was in fact the first who made this claim. Unfortunately, for a long time his contribution in this regard was ignored by subsequent scholarship, not only because *The Concept of Experiencing* remained unpublished during his lifetime, but also because he never returned to a full account of *Stimmungen* as such in his later papers. Yet through a careful reading of his later papers it is possible to notice that Landgrebe did not entirely abandon his early position; on the contrary, his original insight regarding mood or attunement as an essential dimension of our being-in-the-world recurs in different contexts throughout his work. Nonetheless, in contradistinction to Heidegger, Landgrebe emphasizes the importance of considering the topic within a broader account of sensations and corporeality, closer to the idea of a transcendental constitution of the lifeworld in

¹⁵ Edmund Husserl, Hua XLII, *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik*, ed. R. Sowa and T. Vongehr (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 427.

¹⁶ Edmund Husserl, Hua XXXVIII, 176; Edmund Husserl, Hua XLIII, /2, 103.

¹⁷ Edmund Husserl, Hua III/1, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, ed. K. Schuhmann (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 272. In Edmund Husserl, Unpublished Manuscript, Ms. A VI 34, 22a, there is an explicit reference to moods considered as a horizon of values.

¹⁸ For example, this claim is sustained by Nam In Lee. *Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993); Ignacio Quepons, “Intentionality of Moods and Horizon Consciousness in Husserl’s Phenomenology,” in *Feeling and Value, Willing and Action: Essays in the Context of a Phenomenological Psychology*, ed. M. Ubiali and M. Wehrle, 93-103 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015); Roberto Walton, *Intencionalidad y horizonticidad* (Cali: Aula Editorial, Universidad San Buenaventura, 2015), 231. For a critical assessment of these appreciations, see Antonio Ziri6n. “Colorations and Moods in Husserl’s *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*,” 65.

Husserlian terms.¹⁹ Here it is important to mention that all of Landgrebe's reflections during different stages of his career lead toward showing how the genesis of intentionality is connected to the original capacity of the self-motivated movement of an affectively attuned corporeality.²⁰ Moreover, many of his main concerns arise not only from his interpretation of Husserl's *Nachlass*, but from his attempt to reconcile Husserlian positions with Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*.²¹ Even though Landgrebe himself always took the side of his master, in the end he accepted the relevance of Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology insofar as it represented a possibility of reframing transcendental phenomenology far from Husserl's subjectivist emphasis.

Nevertheless, Landgrebe's later investigations, such as *The Concept of Experiencing*, do have strong similarities to Husserl's account of the lifeworld. It is not easy to know whether Landgrebe already had Husserl's reflections on the lifeworld in mind while he was writing *The Concept of Experiencing*. However, the idea of a phenomenological consideration of the *natural world* as a correlate of the natural attitude was already present in other manuscripts and lectures written by Husserl before Landgrebe's book. We should not forget that between 1924 and 1925, Landgrebe was preparing Husserl's 1910/11 lectures on *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* for a publication where the topic of the natural world would be addressed with regard to the work of Avenarius.²² Additionally, and after finishing *The Concept of Experiencing*, Landgrebe started working on Husserl's manuscripts on the lifeworld²³ as well as on the preparation of *Experience and Judgment*.

On the other hand, beyond the importance of Husserl and Heidegger in his thought, the influence of his study of Dilthey is remarkable. The core notion of Landgrebe's reflection in this regard is precisely Dilthey's notion of lived

¹⁹ Ludwig Landgrebe, *Faktizität und Individuation. Studien zu den Grundfragen der Phänomenologie* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1982), 83; Roberto Walton, *Husserl, Mundo, Conciencia y Temporalidad* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Almagesto, 1993), 107.

²⁰ Ludwig Landgrebe, "Phänomenologische Analyse und Dialektik," *Phänomenologische Forschungen*, 10 (1980), 78f.; see Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie. Das Problem einer ursprünglichen Erfahrung* (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1963), 116.

²¹ Roberto Walton, "El lado natural de la subjetividad transcendental," *Revista de la Sociedad Argentina de Filosofía* 5 (1985), 89.

²² Patricio Perkins, "Acerca de la interpretación de Landgrebe sobre el Cartesiano de Husserl," *Investigaciones Fenomenológicas* 11 (2014), 25; Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie. Das Problem einer ursprünglichen Erfahrung* (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1963),

²³ Edmund Husserl, Hua XXXIX, *Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937)*, ed. Rochus Sowa (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), lvii–lviii.

experience, *Erlebnis*, and the possibility of gaining an apprehension of life as a totality. As a matter of fact, *The Concept of Experiencing* may be considered as the further development of the early insights into a phenomenological interpretation of Dilthey that Landgrebe had already presented in his 1928 dissertation:

My project moved, so to speak, within a triangle bounded by Husserl, Dilthey, and Heidegger. My goal was to bring Dilthey's analyses of the historical world into the context of transcendental phenomenology, and thereby to become clear about the relation of the latter to Heidegger's fundamental ontology.²⁴

In this regard we should not forget that even before Heidegger, it was Dilthey himself who introduced the modern understanding of *Stimmung* into the philosophical tradition by describing it as an emotive atmosphere related to our understanding of the surrounding world.²⁵ Jae-Chul characterizes Dilthey's understanding of *Stimmungen* as follows: "Thus *Stimmung* designates the original unity of the human being with the world, a unity that as the original life-disposition always already precedes objective apprehension. What life-disposition means is the relation of life to the world as the original relation to my total existence."²⁶

Landgrebe himself was well aware of this, and he addresses the problem in his dissertation.²⁷ In many senses, it is possible to understand Landgrebe's project as a phenomenological development of Dilthey's early insights regarding the experience of moods as an emotive way of experiencing one's entire life as a concrete totality.

²⁴ "Mein Entwurf bewegte sich sozusagen in dem Dreieck *Husserl-Dilthey-Heidegger*. Mein Ziel war *Dilthey's* Analysen der geschichtlichen Welt in den Kontext der transzendentalen Phänomenologie einzubringen und dabei über deren Verhältnis zu *Heideggers* Fundamentalontologie Klarheit zu gewinnen" – Ludwig Landgrebe, "Ludwig Landgrebe," in *Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen*, ed. L. J. Pongratz, vol. 2 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1975), 140.

²⁵ Wilhelm Dilthey, GS VII, "Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften," (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1927), 46ff.

²⁶ Kim Jae-Chul, *Leben und Dasein. Die Bedeutung Wilhelm Dilthey's für den Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001), 118.

²⁷ Ludwig Landgrebe, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Theorie der Geisteswissenschaft. Analyse ihrer Grundbegriffe," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* 9 (1928), 311, 316.

The Notion of *Stimmung* in *The Concept of Experiencing*

In his book *The Concept of Experiencing*, Landgrebe attempts to describe moods in terms of an existential possibility related to the original experience of action or “doing.” The beginning of his investigation is an exploration of the experience of mood as an essential form of our being-awake [*Wach- Sein*]. For Landgrebe, moods can be described as a dynamic state of subjectivity experienced as an emotive tonality or coloration of the environment. At the moment when we are attuned by the mood, the entire world appears bathed with a color relative to our good humor or bad temper²⁸

Landgrebe further depicts moods as arising with other determinations of our being and as particularly inapprehensible and continually changing. Thus for instance, sometimes we feel ourselves in a bad or a good mood without a precise motive, and the mood colors the entire affective environment in which we live. This might lead to a particular misunderstanding expressed in the question whether the mood comes from the environment or whether the “coloration” over the world comes from our inner life.²⁹ However, from the beginning of his exposition, Landgrebe insists that mood is a disposition for performing actions, and this is the dimension that he is interested in exploring in more detail. Moods are experienced as a power or capability for doing something, involving an affective engagement with an action that in each case is my own concern. On the other hand, moods are a determination of my “being-awake” insofar as the mood determines the way I currently feel about the situation. The capacity for action means that I may decide for or against a certain possibility; nevertheless, I do not decide for or against a mood—instead, the mood is simply there, it comes over me.

In §23b of *The Concept of Experiencing*, Landgrebe contrasts being-attuned [*Gestimmt-Sein*] with being-oriented-toward-something [*Gerichtsetsein-auf-etwas*], which in terms of Husserlian phenomenology is traditionally

²⁸ Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik unseres Selbstverständnisses und zum Problem der seelischen Ganzheit* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2010), 75,82.

²⁹ On the metaphor of affective coloration, see Edith Stein, *Zum Problem der Einfühlung* (Halle: Buchdruckerei des Waisenhauses, 1917); Moritz Geiger, “Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen,” in *Münchener philosophische Abhandlungen. Theodor Lipps zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag*, ed. A. Pfänder (Leipzig: Barth, 1911); see Antonio Ziri6n. “Colorations and Moods in Husserl’s *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*.” It is interesting that the topic also appears in Jan Patočka Patočka, J. *The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem*, ed. I. Chvatik and L. Ubnik, trans. E. Abrams (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2016), 59–60. As Landgrebe himself mentions in his preface to Patočka’s book, they were close friends during the time Landgrebe lived in Prague. Patočka knew about Landgrebe’s book; as a matter of fact, the current edition is based on the exemplar found in the Patočka Archives. See, Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik unseres Selbstverständnisses und zum Problem der seelischen Ganzheit* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2010), 210.

characterized as the form of an intentional act. He holds that the mood is not a form of being-oriented-toward-something, yet it does belong to the realm of our attention.³⁰ Landgrebe's explanation is grounded in his own understanding of the intentional orientation of consciousness, or in his own words, the character of being-directed-toward-something. For Landgrebe, subjectivity is always engaged with a situation, and being attentive is being attentive to something happening. But the mood itself is not a form of being-oriented-toward-something; it can be the case, for instance, that one finds oneself paying attention to something in either a happy or a sad disposition, yet without modifying the sense of the action itself. In the action there is indeed a decision for one possible situation or another, but the mood itself does not involve such a decision: we simply feel attuned. As Landgrebe puts it, "*Our comportment toward the moods that come over us is accordingly not a decision for a particular being-directed-toward, i.e., a decision for or against being-with a mood.*"³¹

A mood is then always something that comes over us in the context of our self-motivation to act, but the mood itself does not depend on a decision for an action. Therefore, being-attuned is always being-attuned with regard to an action, even though we are not necessarily directed toward something by being in a mood. Perhaps we may try to act in accordance with the arousal of a certain mood—for example, we may try to feel better instead of being upset—but this does not mean that such an attempt involves an act of being-oriented-toward-something in the mode of a particular action. In fact, moods "always spread from there through our action as a whole."³² It is true that either a mood may prolong itself and further the action, or it can be pushed back and another mood may take its place—for instance, if we have to deal with something annoying. "However," says Landgrebe, "as long as it is not superseded in this way, it still colors our actions."³³ But what does this mean?

Landgrebe tells us that "joy," for example, "spreads because we are still allowing ourselves to be 'attuned' by it."³⁴ Yet such attunement is not remembering or continuing to recall the joy, but a resonance: "the joy colors our

³⁰Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 78

³¹ "*Das Verhalten zu den uns überkommenden Stimmungen ist daher kein Entscheiden für ein bestimmtes Gerichtetsein-auf, das heißt ein Entscheiden, ob wir bei einer Stimmung dabei sein wollen oder nicht*" – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 79.

³² "sie verbreitet sich von da aus immer über unser Tun im Ganzen" – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 82.

³³ "Solange sie aber nicht in dieser Weise abgelöst ist, färbt sie noch unser Tun" – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 83.

³⁴ "Die Freude breitet sich aus, weil wir uns noch immer von ihr gestimmt sein lassen" – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 83.

actions by ‘reverberating’ in and through us.”³⁵ This resonance is not the same as the retention of the object we are joyfully oriented toward as this object slips further into the past. As Landgrebe writes, “the reverberating mood and its coloring does not sink back into the past in this way, it doesn’t recede into the background—what sinks into the background is that from which [the joy] radiates.”³⁶ Hence moods are not something in the retentional background, something we may turn back to at any time; instead, to turn back is to start doing something again, and this doing something implies the mood. The mood is thus neither an action nor an object toward which an action is directed, but is related to our mode of performing an action [*Vollzugsmodus eines Tuns*]: we are “doing something about something” in a certain way, but we are also thereby “in” a mood.

Landgrebe mentions that moods have still further peculiarities worth mentioning:

To live in a mood and “only” be colored by it without being-with what it radiates from—these are not different modes of being-attuned in the sense in which doing has its modes of performance that indicate different ways of being-with something, e.g., attentively and inattentively. Rather, *any mood, whether we live in it or not, has the peculiarity of spreading out over our being as a whole*, or at least tends to spread over it. And living in a mood does not necessarily mean that it is what has the strongest tendency to dominate us, i.e., to come over us with the greatest intensity, for that a mood subsides when we are no longer directed to what it radiated from does not necessarily mean that the mood would thereby become weaker and lose its efficacy.³⁷

³⁵ “Die Freude ‘klingt in uns nach’ und färbt in diesem Nachklingen unser Tun” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 83.

³⁶ “Die nachklingende und im Nachklingen färbende Stimmung sinkt aber nicht in dieser Weise zurück und tritt nicht in den Hintergrund, in den Hintergrund sinkt das, wovon sie ausstrahlte” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 83.

³⁷ “In einer Stimmung leben und ‘nur’ von ihr gefärbt sein, ohne bei dem dabei zu sein, wovon sie ausstrahlt, sind danach nicht verschiedene Modi des Gestimmtseins in dem Sinne, wie das Tun Vollzugsmodi hat, die auf verschiedene Weisen des Dabeiseins deuten, etwa aufmerksames und unaufmerksames Dabeisein. Vielmehr *jede Stimmung, ob wir in ihr leben oder nicht, hat die Eigenart, dass sie sich über unser Sein im Ganzen ausbreitet* oder wenigstens die Tendenz hat, sich darüber auszubreiten. Und dass wir in einer Stimmung leben, besagt noch nicht notwendig, dass sie diejenige ist, die die stärkste Tendenz hat, uns zu beherrschen, also diejenige, die mit der größten Intensität über uns kommt. Denn dass eine Stimmung abklingt, wenn wir nicht mehr dem zugewendet sind, wovon sie ausstrahlte, muss noch nicht bedeuten, dass sie dadurch schwächer würde und an Wirkungskraft verlöre” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 84.

Actually, Landgrebe adds, such coloring from moods does not mean that they are something additional but accidental to the experience; on the contrary, it is precisely by spreading over us that “they have their strongest power over us”³⁸. Moreover, even though we may reflect upon moods and confirm their sweeping over us, Landgrebe points out that “this being-directed toward them as a special act, which in turn is once again attuned action, must be strictly distinguished from living in the mood and from the immediate being-attuned itself. It is just when we are directed toward it, ascertaining and observing a mood, that it is for the most part already over.”³⁹

On the other hand, it is clear that a concrete attunement originates from a prior act of doing something, and as long as moods spread through the field of active performance, we may say that we are only attuned if we are in the mode of being-oriented-toward-something in the mode of being-awake [*Wach- Sein*].⁴⁰ The emergence of a mood involves a certain familiarity [*Vertrautheit*]; where does this familiarity come from?⁴¹ We feel that something is familiar because it recalls something else we have already previously experienced. This phenomenon of something being recalled while we are doing something else is called association, and it is through association that the sense of familiarity we attribute to the sequence of the experiences is formed.

As Landgrebe indicates,⁴² he bases his account of association on Husserl’s lectures on transcendental logic, subsequently published under the title of *Analyses of Passive Synthesis*,⁴³ and on the *Cartesian Meditations*.⁴⁴ He accordingly describes association by pointing out how every present lived experience continually turns into a past experience, and even though we may continue to seize upon what has just become past, we do not retain the past as a whole—instead, we progressively forget as life flows on. However, this does not mean that we lose the past altogether, for it is passively preserved all along the

³⁸“haben sie ihre stärkste Macht über uns” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 85.

³⁹ “[...] dieses Gerichtetsein auf sie als ein besonderes Tun, das seinerseits wieder gestimmtes Tun ist, muss streng geschieden werden von dem Leben in der Stimmung und von dem unmittelbaren Gestimmtsein selbst. Gerade in diesem Daraufrichten, wenn wir also eine Stimmung feststellen und beobachten, ist sie zumeist auch schon vorbei” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 85.

⁴⁰Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 87

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 94.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 94, n. 34.

⁴³ Edmund Husserl, Hua XI, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926*, ed. M. Fleischer (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 117ff.

⁴⁴ Edmund Husserl, Hua I, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, ed. S. Strasser (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), §§ 39, 51, 61.

stream of consciousness. Further, it is possible not only for at least some of these past moments to be retrieved through explicit acts of remembering, but also for them to be awakened through affection. This is precisely how association works: a current lived experience awakens a former lived experience.

Nevertheless, although the association may awaken the past, the latter may still remain very obscure. It might be the case, for instance, that we experience a “recalling something” that lacks definiteness, so that we experience it as present only because of an inexplicable sense of being familiar with something that we have, in the end, completely forgotten. On the other hand, since association is distinguished by a temporal structure that appears to us in the form of something awakening from past experience, it is experienced as a returning of ourselves to our own past. In this regard, association is not only a psychological topic for empirical research but has an important philosophical significance: it is a fundamental structure of the unity of our self-consciousness.⁴⁵ However, this aspect of the passive relation of the present with the past is only one of a multiplicity of dimensions opened by the phenomenon of association. For example, association brings us back to what we have been-with and what we ourselves have been. To forget or to remember what we were are both possibilities of what we are now, in both cases opened by the phenomenon of association. Both are, according to Landgrebe, “existential possibilities of our being”.⁴⁶ The permanence of our self-consciousness is not achieved by memory, since at any given time we cannot remember everything we were. It is nevertheless because of association that we may realize that we still are what is “behind” us. Yet association is not a merely mechanical process; our self-consciousness is not grounded in any natural or mechanical law, but is a motivational connection.

How is all this related to the problem of the intentionality of moods? The continuity of our self-consciousness is possible because of associatively recalling what we have been, and it turns out that such a possibility is opened from what we are now, in the present, in our actions. In this regard, the awakened memories are generally related to affectively colored experiences involving, for instance, embarrassing situations, happy events, or impending dangers. This “recalling something” is therefore never a mere tendency of some sort, but is always sustained by an accompanying mood, so that the vivid presence of what has been associatively recalled always leads to a mood in which we behave in one way or another:

Thus this being-recalled is never a mere tendency that can then be allowed to play out or resisted; instead, it is always carried by a mood that is apprehended as clinging to the entity we are recalling. *Hence associatively*

⁴⁵Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 95

⁴⁶“existenziale Möglichkeiten unseres Sein” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 96.

“recalling something” is always an attuned recalling—it brings a mood with it, and our comportment toward the mood is one with our comportment toward the memory.⁴⁷

Even if what is recalled from the past no longer affects us, what we are reminded of still radiates a mood spreading across our current disposition.

At this point we may return to Landgrebe’s initial problem concerning the configuration of the horizon of familiarity; and, in this regard, the question is what role the “coloring” of moods plays in relation to the ongoing interplay of associations. On the one hand, an important aspect to be considered is the fact that there is not necessarily a direct connection, based on similarity, between what is recalled and the present object of affection; on the other hand, it is possible that the mood is related not to something familiar, but to the opposite— Landgrebe’s example is to feel something strange. However, either the familiarity or the strangeness may well be based on a hidden associative link recalling a past situation in which the motivation of the mood would indeed be understandable. And in any case, the familiarity of a mood that suddenly surprises us nevertheless points to the unity of the surrounding world [*Umwelt*] in which we are and always have been, as well as to other existing relations of association.⁴⁸

For Landgrebe, then, the arousal of a mood is the proof that the horizon of our being-in-the-world does not come from an active consciousness; instead, everything affects us in a certain way from the past, thereby bringing about the passive constitution of a pre-given familiarity. Such a horizon acquires the form of feeling at home in the sense of the experience and assumption of a field where we can perform our actions, and such a horizon, whether experienced as strange or as comfortable (so that we have a tendency to flee from it or to dwell in it), is “*primarily a horizon of our moods.*”⁴⁹

Here what Husserl was concerned about finally appears. Landgrebe explicitly mentions that what is *primary* is the moods. But what exactly does this mean?

Before the child recognizes anything in his/her surrounding world and knows how to deal with it, what is encountered is already pleasing or sinister; the child reacts completely involuntarily in his/her action without

⁴⁷ “So ist dieses Erinnertwerden niemals eine bloße Tendenz, der dann stattgegeben werden kann oder die bekämpft werden kann, sondern es ist immer von einer Stimmung getragen, die als an dem Seienden haftend, das uns daran erinnert, aufgefasst wird. Immer ist also das ‘Erinnern-an ...’ der Assoziation ein gestimmtes Erinnern, es führt mit sich eine Stimmung, zu der wir in eins mit unserem Verhalten zu der Erinnerung uns verhalten” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 98.

⁴⁸ Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 98-100.

⁴⁹ “Primär ein Horizont unserer Stimmungen” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 123.

yet being able to account for it and before s/he is able to want to do anything in the true sense of the word, to set a goal of his/her willing—the child reacts in such a way that s/he “simply seizes the opportunity” or withdraws from what is encountered. All these are ways in which the child “actively” assesses his/her horizon and thereby appropriates it. What the child was initially afraid of may turn out—perhaps right away—to be something lovely to play with, and from then on it is something one can play with in thus and such a way—a very primitive and initial form of experience within the pregiven horizon of the experienceable. / A much higher level of experience that only arises later involves appropriating what is experienced as something we will be acquainted with in the future, something having these and those determinations that we can account for and explicate as these and those. What this has in common with that primitive behavior is that it is an active experiential assessment of the horizon of our surrounding world—which is, however, always essentially presupposed if we are to do anything at all, even if what we are doing is involuntary and governed by drives. Of course, in this primitive form it is still not at all a horizon of action in the specific form of the I-do we have been exclusively concerned with up to now.⁵⁰

Thus according to the essence of being-attuned, it follows that “*the horizon of our world is primarily opened by the way in which we find ourselves attuned*. Every mood that comes over us is originally a way in which we encounter our surrounding world at that particular time, and in its ‘recalling something,’ it

⁵⁰ “Bevor das Kind noch irgendetwas in seiner Umwelt kennt und weiß, wie es damit umgehen kann, ist ihm das Begegnende schon erfreulich oder unheimlich; ganz unwillkürlich reagiert es in seinem Tun, ohne sich darüber noch Rechenschaft geben zu können und bevor es noch imstande ist, überhaupt etwas im eigentlichen Sinne zu wollen, sich ein Ziel seines Willens zu setzen, in der Weise, dass es ‘einfach zugreift’ oder vor dem Begegnenden zurückweicht. All das sind Weisen, wie es seinen Horizont ‘tuend’ abschreitet und in diesem Abschreiten sich ihm zueignet. Das, wovor es zunächst erschreckt, erweist sich vielleicht sogleich als etwas, womit sich sehr schön spielen lässt, und ist ihm fortan das, womit man so und so spielen kann—eine ganz primitive und erste Form einer Erfahrung innerhalb des vorgegebenen Horizontes des ihm Erfahrbaren.” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 123.

“Eine viel höhere und erst später sich einstellende Stufe der Erfahrung ist das Sich-Zueignen des Erfahrenen als eines künftig Bekannten, das diese und diese Bestimmungen hat, über die wir uns Rechenschaft geben und die wir explizieren können als diese und diese. Sie hat gemeinsam mit jenem primitiven Verhalten, dass sie ein tuendes, im Tun erfahrendes Abschreiten des Horizontes unserer Umwelt ist, der aber immer wesensmäßig vorausgesetzt ist, wenn wir überhaupt etwas, wenn auch ganz unwillkürlich und triebhaft sollen tun können. In dieser primitiven Form ist er freilich noch gar kein Horizont eines Tuns in der spezifischen, bisher von uns ausschließlich berücksichtigten Form des Ich tue” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 123.

predelineates the particular possibilities of being-with in action.”⁵¹ In this way moods are not simply added to our conscious activity and occasionally disregarded; instead, they essentially belong to the context, and the associative form of their coming and going is not only constitutive of the articulation of the surrounding world, but defines the way we display our actions in the form of an experiential understanding of our existence. We always encounter the surrounding world as a whole that recalls, through association, something from the past in the form of an attunement.⁵²

Finally, Landgrebe closes his argument as follows:

The fact that all moods have the tendency to spread their coloration thus also means nothing other than as what comes over us at any particular time, they affect our being-in-the-world in its entirety. They spread over us and our world in one—or they have always already been spread out because they are the specific way our world is open as a horizon for our actions. And it is only on the basis of this spreading out that further determination and articulation of this world horizon come about. In this sense *the thesis of the permanence of our being-attuned* receives its demonstration. It is demonstrated through the insight that by essential necessity, whenever and however we find ourselves in our world, this finding-ourselves as a finding-ourselves in our actively being-with entities is only possible on the basis of the openness of the horizon of our actions — an openness that is primarily comprised of a way of being-attuned in a certain familiar way of “recalling something” that gives our action its direction.⁵³

⁵¹ “Primär ist der Horizont unserer Welt geöffnet durch die Weise, wie wir uns gestimmt finden.

Jede uns überkommene Stimmung ist ursprünglich eine Weise, in der uns unsere Umwelt jeweils begegnet und in ihrem ‘Erinnern-an...’ die bestimmten Möglichkeiten des tuenden Dabeiseins vorzeichnet” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 123.

⁵² See Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 124

⁵³ “Dass alle Stimmungen die Tendenz haben, sich färbend auszubreiten, sagt also auch nichts, als dass sie jeweils als die uns überkommenden unser In-der-Welt-Sein in seinem Ganzen betreffen. Sie breiten sich über uns und unsere Welt in eins aus bzw., sie sind schon immer darüber ausgebreitet, weil sie die bestimmte Weise sind, wie unsere Welt für unser Tun als Horizont offen steht; und erst auf dem Grunde dieser Ausbreitung ergibt sich ihre weitere Bestimmung und Gliederung. In diesem Sinne ist die *These von der Ständigkeit unseres Gestimmtseins* erwiesen. Sie ist erwiesen durch die Einsicht, dass wesensnotwendig, wann und wie immer wir uns in unserer Welt finden, dieses Uns-Finden als ein solches in unserem tuenden Dabeisein bei Seiendem nur möglich ist auf dem Grunde der Offenheit des Horizontes unseres Tuns, einer Offenheit, die primär durch eine Weise des Gestimmtseins ausgemacht ist, eine bestimmte Weise des vertrauten ‘Erinnerns-an...’, das unserem Tun seine Direktion gibt” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 124.

Thus for Landgrebe, in every action we are embedded in a mood that is not itself an act or a mode of action, but functions as a horizon. Moods then work as a link between our current actions and the overall context understood as a field of familiarity. The continuity of this connection is the “permanence” of self-consciousness formed by associative awakening. For Landgrebe it is accordingly not the mere association of object-related remembrance that leads to the formation of the context, but a different kind of associative awakening already evoking the context of moods: the attunement of the entire situation also recalls the attunement of a former mood, so that being-attuned proves to be the medium in which associative awakening takes places and constitutes the sense of familiarity pervading the surrounding world.

In the end, then, what does the term “*primär*” mean in the description of moods? In what does such primacy or priority of moods consist? First of all, we must not forget that Landgrebe is speaking about what is here called the natural world; in this regard, it is possible to suggest that perhaps he meant the priority of the lifeworld as something pregiven in our natural experience prior any theoretical consideration. ~~And~~ Of course, the lifeworld is not the world of mere nature, but a ready-made surrounding world that includes all prescientific assumptions concerning what is simply given as obvious [*selbstverständlich*] in our daily life. Landgrebe nevertheless seems to emphasize the primacy or priority of the most fundamental sphere of passive affections.

Here, however, it is important to mention that Husserl himself did consider moods as a moment of the primal sphere—perhaps not as a moment of objective constitution, but as an undeniable dimension of the sensitive stream of consciousness. Such an aspect of *Stimmung* appears in some of Husserl’s *C* manuscripts from 1931 and 1932.⁵⁴ The most relevant texts⁵⁵ are dated after Landgrebe’s writing but before Husserl expressed his criticism to Landgrebe. On the other hand, although Landgrebe started mentioning the *C* manuscripts in his later papers after the publication of Klaus Held’s *Lebendige Gegenwart*,⁵⁶ there is no direct quote either in Landgrebe or in Held concerning the following passage on the dynamic nature of mood and feeling:

The question here [concerns] the salience and the significance of feelings, and feeling in the unity of the (total) primal impression as mood, but in the mode of streaming constitution, with its forms of non-alteration and alteration. Content and feeling, alteration of content and alteration of

⁵⁴See Edmund Husserl, *Hua Mat VIII*, 300, n.1.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, Nr. 69 and Text Nr. 79c; see also Text Nr. 81.

⁵⁶See Klaus Held. *Lebendige Gegenwart* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966); the citations of the (then unpublished) *C* manuscripts in this work played a key role in bringing such material to the attention of scholars.

feeling, contentual affection through feeling. Feeling as “attracting” and “repelling”; the contentual salience [is] merely a condition of affection in the proper sense. Thus the feeling affects [us] in the mode of “attracting.” What does this mean? ⁵⁷

And for Husserl, moods can indeed function as horizons:

The subjective as affection, as act, as being occupied with the ontic; the subjective as feeling, as mood, as a universal horizontal “life-feeling.”⁵⁸

This description is consistent with another description we may find in a slightly earlier manuscript, in this case from 1930, where Husserl emphasizes the intentionality of moods with regard both to temporal lingering and to the anticipation of the future:

In terms of feeling, the correlate of a satisfying life lies in the style we have characterized as the unity of a *mood of enduring contentment* belonging to every phase of this life [...], and although it is a present moment of life, it nevertheless has a *feeling-intentionality of certain hope* that anticipates the future.⁵⁹

Regarding this passage, Roberto Walton has pointed out that here the notion of *Stimmung* “acquires an eminent connotation as a horizon that extends over all of life, in this case, ethical life.”⁶⁰

Is it not precisely this “horizontal life-feeling” that Landgrebe was attempting to point out by describing moods as a form of horizons? Our answer should be yes and no. In a way, it seems that Landgrebe was closer to Husserl

⁵⁷ “Die hierhergehörige Frage der Abhebung und der Bedeutung der Gefühle und das Gefühl in der Einheit der Urimpression (der totalen) als Stimmung, aber in der Weise der strömenden Konstitution mit ihren Gestalten der Unveränderung und Veränderung. Inhalt und Gefühl, Inhaltsveränderung und Gefühlsveränderung, inhaltliche Affektion durch das Gefühl. Gefühl als ‘Anziehendes’ und ‘Abstoßendes’; die inhaltliche Abhebung bloße Bedingung der Affektion, nicht eigentlich affizierend; also, das Gefühl affiziert in der Weise der ‘Anziehung.’ Was sagt das?” – Edmund Husserl, Hua Mat VIII, 351.

⁵⁸ “Das Subjektive als Affektion, als Aktus, als Beschäftigung mit Ontischem, das Subjektive als Gefühl, als Stimmung, als universales horizonthaftes ‘Lebensgefühl’” – Edmund Husserl, Hua Mat VIII, 351.

⁵⁹ “Korrelat eines befriedigenden Lebens im bezeichneten Stil ist im Gefühl die Einheit einer *Stimmung dauernder Zufriedenheit*, die zu jeder Phase dieses Lebens [...] mitgehört und, obschon Gegenwartsmoment des Lebens, doch eine *Gefühlsintentionalität der sicheren Hoffnung* hat, die die Zukunft antizipiert” Edmund Husserl, Hua XLII, 427–428.

⁶⁰ Roberto Walton, *Intencionalidad y horizonticidad*, 231.

than Husserl himself assumed, at least considering the letter quoted above, since Husserl himself considered moods in terms of intentional horizons. Indeed, Landgrebe seems to be attempting to offer a critical response to Heidegger's account of moods rather than just trying to transform Husserl's notion of horizon in a Heideggerian way. Nevertheless, the discrepancy remains because Husserl still considered such intentional "resonances" of moods in terms of an inner associative process of experiencing life rather than emphasizing the way in which moods shape the appearing world itself, even though he did of course recognize what he called the *ontic* dimension of moods—for instance, in the case of appreciating art or landscapes (examples Dilthey and Geiger also used in describing moods).⁶¹ However, Landgrebe's eyes were not chiefly focused on this inner dimension of life; instead, he was attempting to describe the very constitution of individual life in terms of facticity and being-in-the-world.

The Evolution of Landgrebe's Account of Affectivity: Attuned Movement as Dispositional Capabilities of Embodied Subjectivity

With the sole exception of an intellectual autobiography published in 1975, Landgrebe never again mentions his book *The Concept of Experiencing*,⁶² and besides a short reference in his 1954 essay on the theory of sensations, the topic of *Stimmungen* no longer appears in his work.⁶³ There is nevertheless a clear connection between his original project and the account of affectivity in his later work.

Instead of speaking of *Stimmungen* as horizons, Landgrebe emphasizes the dimension of *Befindlichkeit* with regard to the affective dimension of the kinaesthetic synthesis of motivation involved in the deepest dimension of the stream of consciousness. In open criticism against Heidegger, Landgrebe claims that such "*Befindlichkeit*" is an affective dimension of corporeality.⁶⁴ In this way the "there" that Heidegger refers to in *Sein und Zeit* as the original dimension of our being thrown into the world (a dimension revealed through *Befindlichkeit*) is related to the most original dispositional capabilities [*Vermöglichkeiten*] of lived corporeality. Additionally, the source of individuation, according to Landgrebe, is

⁶¹ Edmund Husserl, Hua XXIII, *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898–1925)*, ed. E. Marbach (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 476.

⁶² See Ludwig Landgrebe. "Ludwig Landgrebe," 140.

⁶³ See Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, 111–123, especially 121.

⁶⁴ See Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, 116; Ludwig Landgrebe, "Phänomenologische Analyse und Dialektik," *Phänomenologische Forschungen*, 10 (1980), 79.

not even such corporeality, as Merleau-Ponty claims, but the pure I,⁶⁵ just as Husserl himself defended in earlier texts.⁶⁶ What Landgrebe was ultimately attempting to describe is the individuation and facticity of the transcendental I in terms of its relation to its primal *capability*: the self-movement of the lived body revealed in attuned movement.

For Landgrebe, access to the field of sensations is thus co-originary with the constitution of lived corporeality. The lived body is the primal access to the sensible surrounding world and provides this world with a synthetic schema correlative to bodily movement.⁶⁷ As Husserl points out in *Ideas II*, the lived body is the organ of perception, and it is through the lived body that the world of natural perception acquires its sensible configuration. Moreover, the body, as center of the senses (smell, sight, hearing, touch, and taste), is not merely the means of access to sensible qualities; instead, the subject is also self-affected by its own sensibility even while experiencing the sensible determinations of physical objects, particularly in the sense of touch.⁶⁸

On the other hand, the body is also a synthetic unity of free and self-motivated movement involving an essential connection between feeling and movement understood as “sensible consciousness of movement” or kinaesthesia. However, the central point concerning the kinaesthetic field is that two intentional syntheses are involved, one constituting the unity of corporeality and the other constituting the field of free movement itself. Thus according to Landgrebe, the kinaestheses are at the same time sensation and sheer consciousness of movement.⁶⁹ Furthermore, since every sensation is a feeling of oneself through the constitution of the body as the progressive result of a synthesis of kinaesthetic motivation, this gives rise to a primal form of unreflective consciousness related to the practical potentiality “I move” in the form of “I feel my own movement,” and within my own life this felt potentiality is itself originally manifest as a sensible field constitutively co-involved in the manifestation of every other sensible being.⁷⁰

⁶⁵Ludwig Landgrebe, *Faktizität und Individuation*, 86.

⁶⁶See, e.g., Edmund Husserl, Hua XIII, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Band I: 1905–1920*, ed. I. Kern (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 5f., from around 1908.

⁶⁷Roberto Walton, “El lado natural de la subjetividad transcendental,” 92.

⁶⁸Edmund Husserl, Hua IV, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. M. Biemel (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 145–146.

⁶⁹Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie* 116f.

⁷⁰Edmund Husserl, Hua XI, 13f.

According to Landgrebe, however, such “sensibility” is not simply a mere sensation of, for example, being-touched, but refers to a broader dimension involving the existential affectivity of *Befindlichkeit*. In this regard, the self-affectivity of the sensibility manifest in corporeality is in each case always a dynamic structure oriented toward affective impulses, each of a different degree and complexity—a structure that at the same time lends an affective tonality to every movement impulse, particularly in the practical sphere, through the synthetic unity of the freely—motivated consciousness of movement. Thus the field of sensations is not a mere complex of isolated “sense data,” but is originally experienced as a nexus of mutually interwoven affective saliences that are connected in turn to movement impulses toward or away from what is given as attractive or repulsive.

For Landgrebe, then, the exhibition of sensible qualities such as sounds or colors is grounded in the kinaesthetic field of sensible affectivity, and in this regard the entire affective field is supported by the constitutive synthesis of lived corporeality. But according to Landgrebe, this means that the fundamental structure of *Befindlichkeit* is essentially connected to sensible affectivity. Thus the fundamental contribution of Landgrebe in this regard lies in his description of the spatial field in terms of a practical and pre-given horizon of movement possibilities constituted, along with their corresponding moments of felt sensibility and affective tonality, in passive syntheses prior to reflection—possibilities that find their articulation in the progressive constitution of lived corporeality and its habitual “practical kinaesthetic horizon.”⁷¹ As a primal potentiality above all other “I can” potentialities, the “I move” is what allows any possible synthesis of habituality. Indeed, the constitution of the surrounding world as a field of significance is ongoingly shaped as the correlate of a progressive synthesis of motivations and attuned movement tendencies operating in different types and degrees of affective interests. To put it another way, the affective horizons gain their significance by a teleological sense involved in the movement tendencies stemming from the unity of lived corporeality. According to Landgrebe, such a teleological tendency is the very origin of intentionality in general,⁷² functioning as a primal awareness that suffuses lived corporeality from the very beginning without becoming an object of reflection:

What kind of “knowing” or “being aware” do we have prior to developed I-consciousness? It precedes reflection and is one with the performance of

⁷¹ Edmund Husserl, Hua XI, 15.

⁷² Ludwig Landgrebe, “Das Problem der Teleologie und der Leiblichkeit in der Phänomenologie und in der Marxismus,” in *Phänomenologie und Marxismus. 1: Konzepte und Methoden*, ed. B. Waldenfels, J. M. Broekman, and A. Pažanin, 71–104 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 76; Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phänomenologische Analyse und Dialektik,” *Phänomenologische Forschungen* 10 (1980), 78.

the kinaestheses as a “body feeling” of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. To be sure, the term “body feeling” is not quite suitable insofar as it means something “inward” where a self-knowing inwardness is not yet given at all. Heidegger’s concept of *Befindlichkeit* could more aptly characterize this awareness, since it is not a mere ‘feeling,’ but points to [our] situation in the midst of that which affects us and toward which kinaesthetic movement is directed. In this sense it is the *initial opening of the world*. It precedes reflection, and in the immediacy of its performance, it cannot be brought into view reflectively, for as we have already seen, the reflectively objectified performance is never the immediate happening. *There is more to understand about the world and our situation in the world than reflection can catch up with.*⁷³

Thus if we compare Landgrebe’s early descriptions of attuned being-directed-toward an object in “doing something”—and particularly the role of moods functioning to open the horizon of the world as a practical field—it is not hard to notice the consistency with his later descriptions of the lifeworld. The clue that is missing in his early works but becomes crucial in his later papers is the role of corporeality.

In short, we may conclude that according to Landgrebe’s descriptions, it is possible to consider *Stimmungen* not only in terms of subjective affective dispositions, but as the expression of the affective practical horizon of the lifeworld grounded in the constitutive dimension of lived corporeality in movement. Landgrebe’s strong claim regarding the *primacy* of moods remained constant along his career, but is better explained once we consider, on the one hand, the horizon of the lifeworld, and on the other hand, the constitutive dimension of lived corporeality.

⁷³ “Welcher Art ist dieses ‘Wissen’ oder ‘Innesein’ vor dem entwickelten Ichbewußtsein? Es geht der Reflexion darauf voran, ist eins mit dem Vollzug der Kinästhesen als ein befriedigtes oder unbefriedigtes ‘Leibgefühl.’ Der Ausdruck Leibgefühl ist freilich insofern nicht ganz zutreffend, weil er ein ‘Innerliches’ meint, wo eine sich wissende Innerlichkeit noch gar nicht gegeben ist. Heideggers Begriff der Befindlichkeit könnte dieses Innesein treffender charakterisieren, weil es nicht bloßes ‘Gefühl’ ist, sondern Anzeige der Lage inmitten dessen, was affiziert und worauf kinästhetische Bewegung gerichtet ist. In diesem Sinne ist es die *erste Eröffnung von Welt*. Es geht der Reflexion voran und ist in der Unmittelbarkeit seines Vollzugs nicht reflektiv in den Blick zu bringen; denn wie wir schon gesehen haben: der reflektiv vergegenständlichte Vollzug ist niemals der unmittelbar geschehende. *Er gibt uns mehr von Welt und unserer Lage in der Welt zu verstehen, als reflektiv eingeholt werden kann*” – Ludwig Landgrebe, *Faktizität und Individuation*, 83.