

Creative Order **The Case for Speculative Metaphysics**

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It is an enormous honour to have been invited to give the first of a series of lectures in honour of James Bradley, my friend and colleague of some forty four years.¹ It is not meant to be a very rigorous analysis of Jim's philosophical work but rather an informal attempt to put that work into some historical perspective. The closer analysis I leave to the distinguished lecturers who will continue the series. Consequently, this is more a kind of philosophical reminiscence than a lecture.

In the first place I would like to use the title "Creative Order" as a lead into what follows. About ten years ago Jim asked me whether I would be interested in collaborating on, as he argued, a study, much needed for insertion into current philosophical offerings—an area of philosophy much neglected in recent times, yet vital to the continuity of the grand tradition, stemming from the Greek philosophers, concerning the meaning of being and existence. It was his view that the idea of creation, rightly understood, was the key to the development of metaphysics in the post-medieval world. Although not always recognised, the reconception of being as *esse* or existence stemmed from the progression of being as "substance" to that of being as activity, the activity of actualization. Being was no longer to be thought of as the instantiation of unchanging essences or forms but rather as the origin of the new and unprecedented. It was with the nature of this most universal origination that speculative metaphysics must concern itself. The proposed book would begin with a theoretical introduction to the notion of speculative metaphysics, and would then be concerned with tracing something of the history of metaphysics understood in this way. From Aquinas and Scotus, through the speculative thought of Hegel and Schelling onward to Bradley and Collingwood, Bergson, Whitehead, Peirce and Heidegger in a recognisable "history," but also with a view to breaking some new ground in this field. This would be achieved by way of a harvesting of the implications of these thinkers. We did set to work on this project and parts of it have already seen the light of day in various articles. It remains incomplete.

¹ This paper was given on 30 October 2012 at Memorial University of Newfoundland as the inaugural lecture in a series of lectures in honor of Professor James Bradley.

This, however, is to reach the end before the beginning. What I propose to do just now (as the Scots would say) is to trace something of Jim's philosophical odyssey, from the time when we first got to know each other in Cambridge in 1968. Our rooms at St Edmund's House (now "College"), Cambridge, were next to each other. He was there as a boarding undergraduate of Christ's College and I as a refugee theologian who had been kindly welcomed and given a Fellowship by St Edmund's. It was a time perilous for Catholic theologians! Jim was reading English and one of the papers he could choose for his "trips" was a philosophy paper—the set text, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. As he set about reading the text, Jim was soon fascinated by Kant's close and cogent argument; and, while continuing to lead the life of a Cambridge undergraduate with great gusto, it was then that he acquired that passion for philosophy which never left him. He did not become a Kantian; but he recognised philosophical genius in what he read. Philosophy became his first and all pervasive interest then and for the rest of his life.

After completing his MA and a post-graduate diploma in theology, Jim enrolled in the PhD programme in the faculty of Divinity and was assigned as his Supervisor the noted philosopher Professor Donald MacKinnon who was at that time the Norris Hulse Professor of philosophical theology in the University of Cambridge. Philosophy in Cambridge at this level could be studied under the aegis of the Divinity Faculty, the Department of Philosophy or that of the History and Philosophy of Science. Movement between these faculties and departments was endlessly fluid. Jim chose as the subject of his thesis the "The Philosophy of Feeling of F.H. Bradley." Apart from the attraction of synonymity, Jim was interested in the transposition of Idealist thought from Germany to the more empiricist, down to earth soil of the British tradition. He was later to publish a pair of highly informative articles on British Idealism, under the title, "Hegel in Britain" which appeared in the *Heythrop Journal*.² To carry out this work he transferred to a new and, for him, very influential supervisor in the person of the Reader in History and Philosophy of Science, Dr. Gerd Buchdahl, a refugee from Germany by way of Australia, I believe. He was the author of the important work, *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins—Descartes to Kant*.³ From Buchdahl Jim learned concern for meticulous but enlightened scholarship. He eventually completed his PhD thesis, "F.H. Bradley's Metaphysics of Feeling" and in 1983 was awarded the PhD degree.⁴

² James Bradley, "Hegel in Britain: A Brief History of British Commentary and Attitudes," Part One, *The Heythrop Journal*, 20 (January 1979): 1-24; Part Two, *The Heythrop Journal*, 20 (April 1979): 163-82.

³ Gerd Buchdahl, *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins—Descartes to Kant* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970).

⁴ Some of Bradley's early work on Bradley was published under the following titles: James Bradley, "The Critique of Pure Feeling: Bradley, Whitehead, and the Anglo-Saxon Metaphysical Tradition," *Process Studies* 14 (1985): 253-64; idem "F.H. Bradley's Metaphysics of Feeling and its Place in the History of Philosophy," in *The Philosophy of F.H. Bradley*, eds. A. Manser and

What I think he learned from his work on Bradley in particular was that metaphysics could just as well be grounded in the empirical as in the ideal and did not need to take flight into realms of pure idealism or apriorism.

In 1984-1985 he was awarded a prestigious Humboldt Fellowship at the University of Munich. This began his “continental” links and proved to be the beginning of a very large number of international connections from which Memorial and its Philosophy department benefited enormously over the years.

In the intervening years I had found my way to the Department of Philosophy at Memorial University where I first went at the invitation of J.G. (Peter) Dawson as a visiting lecturer and eventually obtained a regular tenure track appointment two years later. By 1986 I was finishing a six year stint as Head of Department and we needed a replacement position for the following academic year. The department was persuaded that Jim’s background and interests made him an excellent candidate and invited him to accept this position. And to be thoroughly unoriginal and trite, ‘the rest is history.’ From here on Jim’s philosophical career was linked inextricably with the life of Memorial’s Department of Philosophy. Under the leadership first of Dawson and subsequently of F.L. (Lin) Jackson, the department had developed important strengths in historical philosophy for which Jim was ideally fitted. Apart from the occasional *faux pas*, as on one occasion saying quite outrageously, “of course in a real university. . .” by which he meant Oxbridge, Jim thrived and prospered in the department, not only by his powerful teaching capacity but also by his attention to the availability of philosophical material in the University Bookstore and the ongoing development of the Philosophy collection in the University Library. In the mean time he devoted his boundless philosophical energy to ongoing research and publication. He enriched the life of the department also by his overseas connexions and arranged important liaisons, notably with the University of Hannover with which there were a number of exchanges.

F.H. Bradley remained an influence on Jim’s later work. Eventually in 1996 he edited and contributed to a symposium collection: *Philosophy after F.H. Bradley*, published by the Thoemes Press in Bristol, U.K.⁵ His own contribution to the symposium was titled: “From Presence to Process: F.H. Bradley and A.N Whitehead.”⁶ This gives an interesting glimpse into the movement of his focus of interest in the years of his early work at Memorial. In his essay, Jim focuses on Bradley’s method and highlights on the one hand the appeal to the principle of Reason—about which more later—but also on the experimental nature of his philosophical inquiries. In some circles it was assumed that metaphysics in the Idealist tradition must inevitably be aprioristic and axiomatic. On the contrary Bradley (F.H.) adopts an experimental approach which he describes in the

G. Stock (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1984), 227-42; idem, “Relations, intelligibilité et noncontradiction dans la métaphysique du sentir de F.H.Bradley: une réinterprétation,” Part I, *Archives de philosophie* 54, 4 (1991): 529-51; Part II, *Archives de philosophie* 55, 1 (1992): 77-91.

⁵ James Bradley, ed. *Philosophy After F.H. Bradley* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996).

⁶ James Bradley, “From Presence to Process: Bradley and Whitehead,” in James Bradley, ed., *Philosophy After F.H. Bradley* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), 147-68.

following terms—Jim quotes Bradley in *Appearance and Reality*: “I have assumed that the object of metaphysics is to find a general view which will satisfy the intellect, and I have assumed that whatever succeeds in doing this is real and true, and whatever fails is neither.”⁷ In other words, the assumption of the inquiry is that it is the world which we are trying to understand, and that in some sense this world is intelligible.

I quote this because as we shall see, Jim appeals to what he refers to as the “principle of reason” and endorses the idea that metaphysics is of its nature experimental—characteristics that he will find spelled out by Peirce.

It is worth remembering that the philosophical world in which he had worked at Cambridge, in spite of notable exceptions such as his two supervisors, already mentioned, Dorothy Emmet and a handful of others, was dominated by two schools of thought, both of which were essentially hostile to metaphysics. On the one hand the logical positivists and their successors in the logical analysis school heavily influenced by the likes of A.J. Ayer and Gilbert Ryle; and on the other by the Wittgensteinians who had been gaining influence by thinkers such as Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach. To both schools, metaphysics was essentially something which died with idealism. To pursue metaphysical inquiry was therefore in those days very much to swim against the philosophical tide. The vogue of so-called “continental” philosophy had not yet emerged in the schools of the sixties and early seventies in Britain. In such a context, the pursuit of metaphysical inquiry called for a singular degree of independence of mind. But Jim believed very strongly that the great western tradition of metaphysics would survive these negative, and perhaps passing reactions.

In his own work, he felt the need to move on from Bradley, from whom he had learned a great deal. Apart from the work of R.G. Collingwood—to which he would much more recently return⁸—Jim’s philosophical interest turned to the work of A.N. Whitehead and the notion of existence as “process.”⁹ Whitehead’s earlier career had been entirely in the field of mathematics and his first claim to fame was as the co-author with Bertrand Russell of the acclaimed *Principia Mathematica*. In fact his entire career until his appointment to Harvard had been as a mathematician. But his appointment to Harvard in 1924 was as Professor of Philosophy—a post which reflected the divergence of his interests from those of Russell and which he held until 1937. In this period he developed his theory of

⁷ F.H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (London: Oxford University Press), 491.

⁸ James Bradley, “A Key to Collingwood’s Essay on Metaphysics: The Logic of Creedal Rules,” in *Handbook on Collingwood*, eds. C. Kobayashi, M. Marion, and A. Skodo (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

⁹ Bradley’s publications on Whitehead are too numerous to cite here. Suffice it to reference a few of the most important: James Bradley, “Whitehead, Heidegger, and the Paradoxes of the New,” *Process Studies*, 20, 3 (1991): 127-50; idem, “La cosmologie transcendentale de Whitehead: la transformation spéculative du concept de construction logique,” *Archives de philosophie* 56, 1 (1993): 1-26; idem, “Transcendentalism and Speculative Realism in Whitehead,” *Process Studies* 23, 3 (1994): 155-90; idem, “The Speculative Generalization of the Function: A Key to Whitehead,” *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 64 (2002): 253-271. In the early 90s, Bradley corresponded with Gilles Deleuze about Bradley’s work on Whitehead, which Deleuze praised highly.

“process.” As one writer suggests, his movement to the recognition of being as *process* rather than *substance*, was as profound a development in metaphysics as his work with Russell had been in mathematics and logic.¹⁰ In Whitehead’s work Jim believed that he had found an important key to the nature of existence as the activity of actualization in which the dominance of the concept of essence had been finally overcome and existence as self-actualization could be made comprehensible. In this respect, an article which epitomizes this Whiteheadian phase in Jim’s conception of speculative metaphysics is one he published in *Process Studies*, in the Fall of 1994 with the title: “Transcendentalism and Speculative Realism in Whitehead.”

The article is notable in a number of ways. I think that at this stage Jim had recognised that the complexity of his arguments had become a barrier to a more general understanding and consequently presented his case in the form of a number of clearly stated “theses” which he proceeded to state, explicate and justify. This became a characteristic of his writing right up to the final article to which I will later turn. In this article Jim outlines the importance as well as the limitations of Aquinas’s notion of *esse* or active existence and the way in which these limitations were overcome by Whitehead:

On the first question [on the rationality and intelligibility of things] Whitehead’s position is perhaps best stated in this way: while with Aquinas he gives *esse*—finitely understood as the act or occasion of being—primacy over essence, unlike Aquinas he does not hold the individual to be intelligible only in terms of essence; i.e. the subject or first substance is not defined in terms of eminent, exemplary structures. Rather, Whitehead develops a form of analysis in which, extraordinarily, *esse* itself becomes the principle of intelligibility; by defining *esse* transcendently in terms of serially-related structures of self-actualization, *esse* is for the first time articulated as both what makes a thing to be and what makes it intelligible. In Whitehead, it is the structures of finite, serial self-actualization which themselves constitute the conditions of empirical intelligibility.¹¹

Were this an properly academic paper there would here be a footnote here to the problem of the knowledge of “individuals” in the medieval schools which led to Scotus’s formulation of the notion of *haecceitas*—a very interesting development which did not quite “cut the mustard” in the way that Whitehead’s move did. Here we begin to see more clearly the outlines of what Jim came to term “creative order.”

However, just as Whitehead had moved across the Atlantic to North America, so the next phase in Jim’s philosophical progress took him to the

¹⁰ Peter Hare, “Whitehead,” in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford University Press, 1995), 909.

¹¹ Bradley, “Transcendentalism and Speculative Realism in Whitehead,” 182.

American philosopher, the strange genius of Charles Saunders Peirce (1839-1914). There are many areas of Peirce's philosophy which to me present huge barriers, largely because of my weakness in mathematics and logic, in which Peirce excelled and to which he made important contributions. For the very same reasons he excited Jim who found in him the more or less complete philosopher who, unlike many of his contemporaries and successors in the English speaking traditions, was well acquainted with medieval thought as well as with German idealism, not least with that of Schelling. In one of his by no means rare "cheeky" moments, Jim referred to Peirce, at least in regard to metaphysics, as "cleaned up Schelling." What particularly excited Jim was the deployment of the principle of triunity, about which I will say more about in the final section.¹²

Peirce's name historically has been inseparable from what is known as Pragmatism. This has often been understood as the theory that truth is nothing more than "what works" and moreover that it stems from a profound scepticism about the nature of Truth. When understood without refinement this of course is entirely destructive of classical metaphysics, ethics and even logic. Precisely because of these misunderstandings, some of which are attributable to his colleague William James, Peirce adopted the rather strange label of pragmatism by which he preferred his own philosophy to be identified. But the idea that since "reality" is unknowable in itself, whatever works goes was entirely alien to Peirce's thinking. It is true that Peirce dispensed with the cumbersome idealist appeals to an "absolute." But at the same time he endorsed what Jim refers to as the Principle of Reason. There is nothing in reality which defies possible explanation. We may not know the explanation but it goes against reason to think that there are aspects of the real for which there really is no explanation.

This needs a word of qualification since Peirce also embraced the idea which he referred to as tychism—that there are "chance" events in nature, not least in cosmological evolution, which are indeterminate in the sense that they are unpredictable. This is not at all the same as claiming that they are "unintelligible." As I understand it, it is not the embracing of unintelligibility but the rejection of a purely deterministic cosmos that is the question here. Chance events however can in their turn give rise to intelligible regularities, or probabilistic laws. It was this combination of flexibility and corrigibility in the formulation of explanations which provided a way out of the impasse of determinism versus unintelligible randomness. The notion or concept of "creation," shorn of its mythological associations, allows for the coming to be of the new and unprecedented, without which any understanding of an evolutionary

¹² See James Bradley, "The Triune Event: Event Ontology, Reason, and Love," in *Event and Decision: Ontology and Politics in Badiou, Deleuze, and Whitehead*, eds. Roland Faber, Henry Krips, and Daniel Pettus (London: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 97-114; idem, "Beyond Hermeneutics: Peirce's Semiology as a Trinitarian Metaphysics of Communication," *Analecta Hermeneutica* 1 (2009): 45-57.

cosmology and biology, would be incomprehensible. Hence the importance of the notion of “creation” in its philosophical sense.¹³

Peirce is widely known for his deployment of the “categories” of “firstness,” “secondness,” and “thirdness.” I cannot begin to give an account of how these may be deployed for example and most famously in semiotics—for in this area, nothing “stays still” and what is an example of “firstness” in one context can metamorphose in the twinkling of a brain cell into “secondness” or even “thirdness”—it is all to do with the angle we are coming from—or something like that. In principle, however, it is a theory of the deployment of what Jim came to call the principle of “trinity”—about which, more in a moment.

In Jim’s philosophical career we have reached what was tragically to be its final stage. In the midst of enormously fruitful work, most particularly with regard to speculative metaphysics, Jim was taken ill with a deadly cancer which invaded first his lungs and then began to infect that incredibly fertile and productive brain. Work on the book on speculative metaphysics came to a halt. It is hoped to publish the already completed work on the book along with other important unpublished material. Even in his latter days of increasing sickness, Jim oversaw the putting together of a great amount of this material, assisted in this as in so much of his life and work by his treasured wife and co-worker, Jennifer Dyer.

I think perhaps his last formal presentation was to the conference held at the well-known extension of Memorial University, *The Gun’nor Pub*, of the Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy.¹⁴ Eloquently and poignantly he ended his paper with the words: “With this, I rest my case for speculative philosophy.” I think he knew that this would be his last word on speculative metaphysics. But the paper began with a piece of irrepressible cheek, an attack on the very concept of “continental philosophy”—talk about bearding lions in dens! But the paper does put together in a concise but powerful manner the main lines of his final position—a position which, had he lived longer would have undergone endless revision. I feel sure that he would have responded with vigour to the subsequent explorations of his work by his colleagues, represented in this tribute to him.

How many of our conversations have ended with something like: Jim: “You can tear that one (probably of last week!) up—I have revised the whole thing!” or words to that effect. By which time I had probably worked through about half of a very densely argued article! He was himself his own most continual critic.

I will end by trying to show why Peirce’s triunity of firstness, secondness and thirdness was able to bring to, at least a provisional conclusion, the

¹³ See Peter Harris, “Can ‘Creation’ be a Metaphysical Concept?” in *Approaches to Metaphysics*, ed. William Sweet (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), 155-164.

¹⁴ The conference was held 6-8 October 2011. Bradley’s paper, which was given on the afternoon of the 8th, was later published in the CSCP journal. See James Bradley, “Philosophy and Trinity,” *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 16, no. 1 (2012): 155-177.

philosophical inquiry which was the substance of Jim's philosophical life. On occasion he would summarise the essence of these categories as "origin," "order," "communication,"—these were the fundamental categories of existence taken in the strong sense—as Jim would say—like tea! The whole notion of speculative philosophy depended on taking existence not simply as instantiation of a variable, nor, as Kant would have it, simply as a non-determining predicate, adding nothing to the determination of the object; but rather as the fundamental activity of actualization, or as Aquinas would have it, of *esse*—as opposed to *essentia*. The difference from Kant is subtle but at the same time absolutely crucial. In a particularly powerful paper delivered to the Claremont Conference on "Metaphysics and Things" (2010), Jim wrote:

It [existence] is not a real or determining predicate, for it does not add any determinate feature or content to the concept of an object [so far, complete agreement with Kant!]. Rather '-exists' is a non-determining predicate; *It is taken to designate that activity which is the reason why things have any determining predicates at all. Existence is here understood as 'active' existence or 'actualization*.¹⁵

What Jim saw here as the brilliant thread running through western metaphysical thought was the essentially relational nature of existence. What Aristotle had conceived as the highest and most perfect kind of "divine" being" was the activity of *νόησις νόησεως* or "thought thinking itself." The divine life in Christian theology and speculation was conceived indeed as essentially an activity rather than a "substance" and as triune in its interrelations. In ordinary theology this triunity was known as the relationship of three "hypostases"—Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The drawback of this personification—essential indeed to Christian worship—*lex orandi lex credendi*—was the obscuring of divine being as pure, relational activity. But, for Aquinas, for example, the divine nature or essence consists precisely in these interrelated, circumincessive, relational activities.

The significance of this I have already alluded to in the section on Whitehead. As Jim recognised, in the theological tradition, this triunity could be conceived on a "rationalistic" model, as in Aquinas, in whom divine knowledge precedes divine love; or, conversely, on a "voluntaristic" model as in Bonaventure and Scotus, for whom divine love is the foundation of the Trinitarian life. In modern, idealist philosophy, the former might be exemplified in Hegel, with the primacy of the Absolute as Idea, and the latter in Schelling with the primacy of the Absolute as Potency.¹⁶

¹⁵ James Bradley, "The Semiotic Object: Speculative Philosophy, Nominalism and Triunity," paper given at "Metaphysics and Things: New Forms of Thought," the Fourth International Conference of the Whitehead Research Project, Claremont University, 2-4 December, 2010, unpublished.

¹⁶ You might be surprised, and no doubt the clientele of *Chapters* and *Starbucks* would be astounded to know, that these differences formed the subject of numerous debates over Lattes and Capuccinos at our fairly frequent, though latterly not quite so frequent, *coseries*—at which we

It would be boring at this point to rehearse the case for each of these positions. What is the point, however, is that in Jim's work the continuities between ancient philosophy, Christian theology and the subsequent cultural history of the western world could enlighten our understanding of the nature of the world we live in and what is at stake in our civilization, not merely what are the current trends in academic philosophy.

When I tried to sketch out what I might say about the culmination of over forty years of strenuous philosophical thought and research, I had thought that I might conclude by way of a fuller account of the last and most recently published paper "Philosophy and Trinity." When I took it up again to see what I might say about it, I realised that Jim had managed in a gargantuan effort to muster in one place just about everything that he had come to argue about the nature and importance of speculative metaphysics. Among other things I think it manifests an extraordinary command of the contemporary philosophical scene in so far as it has a bearing on the nature and vindication of speculative metaphysics. No single talk, least of all by myself, could do justice to the strength, rigour and wide-ranging nature of what is there put forward. It is not easy reading but it is demanding and not the easiest of introductions to his argument for the speculative metaphysics of triunity. I think that it will be up to the subsequent lectures in this series to get to grips with the detail of this argument.

As an alternative I have thought it might be worthwhile to raise and attempt to answer the question which, no doubt, some have asked and may continue to ask: Is this kind of speculative metaphysics simply crypto-theology? The repeated appeals to the notions of *Trinity* and *Triunity* surely betray a dependence on views that have passed with the passing of Christian faith in the Academy.

What I will try is something between the short answer and the long one. When we philosophise, we philosophise inevitably and unavoidably in a *tradition*. Even as radical an anti-metaphysician as Martin Heidegger [Anglice: "Hedger"—rather less impressive!] who could herald the "end of philosophy" recognised both the inescapability of that tradition and moreover that he had spent his philosophical life in dialogue with that Tradition. One can indeed attempt to do philosophy "a-historically," and this would surely be true of many logical analytic philosophers and many post-Witgensteinians, but that is a choice, not an unassailable rule—just as, for example, atheism and theism are choices, in spite of what, as Terry Eagleton has termed them, the Ditchkins shout from the contemporary rooftops—or sides of London buses!

A great deal of Jim's work aimed to show the permeation of the *philosophical* tradition by the notion of Triunity—the idea of the three-in-one is to be found in Plato as well as in Aquinas and Scotus.¹⁷ It shapes the great

discussed not only high philosophy but also the latest news from the university and the department. I am vain enough to believe that on both counts Jim valued my comment. We certainly enjoyed these, for me, post retirement updates. I miss them dearly.

¹⁷ Both of us were delighted when we read H-G.Gadamer's essay, "The Dialectic of the Good in Plato's *Philebus*" (H-G. Gadamer, *The Idea of the Good in the Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*,

Critical system of Kant and passes over powerfully into Schelling and Hegel. It is fundamental in the thought of Collingwood and Peirce. There is no appeal in these philosophers to the authority of Christian doctrine or dogma. It will be interesting to see what subsequent contributors to this series will have to say on this question. It is here that I will end my sketch of Jim's "Philosopher's Progress."

Jim's contribution to the philosophy of our time is attested not only by his published work but also by the impressive list of his invitations to speak in universities across Europe, from Germany (Hannover, Munich, Bayreuth, Berlin, Wuppertal), Holland (Amsterdam, Nijmegen, Utrecht, Belgium (Brussels—the Belgian Academy, Leuven) Vienna, Bucharest as well as universities in the UK, Canada and the United States. In addition to this, Jim arranged through these contacts for visits to Memorial of a number internationally known figures—it might be tedious to add another list. But the life of the Philosophy Department and its teachers and students, undergraduate and graduate, has been enviably enriched by this web of international philosophy which he wove. One hopes that the tradition will continue. But the enrichment to the lives of his students of his teaching, advice and, yes, their social life is, I am sure, unrepeatable and will be sorely missed. For Jim the original meaning of "university" at the time of their origin was its most profound meaning: "the community of teachers and scholars," as exemplified in our department as well as in its Jockey Club and its marvelous blend of the academic and the social—at which Jim was indeed a genius.

trans. P. Christopher Smith [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986], 104-25). Jim had quite strong reservations about Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy but certainly had a great admiration for his highly enlightening work on Plato and Aristotle.